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No. 20120158 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY 
SAINTS, an Association of Individuals, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
THOMAS C. HORNE, BRUCE R. WISAN, MARK L. SHURTLEFF, 
HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG, and INTERVENORS, et al., 
Defendants/Appellants. 
MARK L, SHURTLEFF'S FIRST BRIEF ON CERTIFIED QUESTION 
Utah Attorney General, Mark L. Shurtleff, respectfully submits his 
first brief on a certified question of law. 
Jurisdictional Statement 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified a 
single question of state law that this Court accepted. The Court possesses 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
original jurisdiction to answer that certified question under Utah Code 
j 
Annotated § 78A-3-102(1) (West 2009). 
Question Presented 
Utah preclusion law prevents previously litigated claims and issues 
from being re-litigated. After review of an extensive trial court record, the 
submission of briefs, and receipt of oral argument in a prior original action, 
this Court denied the Plaintiff Association's petition for extraordinary relief 
and dismissed its substantive allegations, finding the Association waited too 
long to press its claims and that laches therefore barred its request. 
Dissatisfied, the Plaintiff Association returned to federal court to press the 
same, underlying allegations and causes of action. That Court refused to 
give preclusive effect to this Court's laches determination and granted the 
Association preliminary relief. That preliminary order is now on appeal 
before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. To aid its resolution of that case, 
the Tenth Circuit has asked * 
[u]nder Utah preclusion law, is the Utah Supreme 
Court's discretionary review of a petition for 
extraordinary writ and subsequent dismissal on laches < 
grounds a decision "on the merits" when it is 
accompanied by a written opinion, such that later 
adjudication of the same claim is barred? 
i 
2 
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See Order Certifying State Law Question, attached as addendum A. 
Standard of Review 
When a federal court certifies a question of state law, this Court 
answers "the legal questionf ] presented without resolving the underlying 
dispute." In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71, H 6, 99 P.3d 793 
Determinative Statutory or Constitutional Provisions 
The certified question presents a legal question answered by Utah's 
common law. Consequently, no determinative statutory or constitutional 
provisions pertain. 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
This case stems from a lengthy Utah state court probate proceeding 
and that court's 2005 order reforming the United Effort Plan (UEP) Trust, a 
Utah religious charitable trust. Several years after that fact, the Plaintiff 
Association sued Utah Attorney General Mark L. Shurtleff and others in a 
United States District Court for alleged First Amendment violations 
stemming from the reformation and subsequent administration of that Trust. 
Jt. App. 469-502. That Court granted the Association's motion for 
3 
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preliminary injunctive relief. Jt. App. 22-69. But in the time intervening 
the filing of that action and the federal court's preliminary order, this Court 
accepted and then denied the Plaintiffs Association petition for 
extraordinary relief that alleged many of the same constitutional claims, 
finding the affirmative defense of laches barred the Association's claims. 
See The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ, as Association of 
Individuals v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P.3d 1054 {Lindberg) (attached as 
addendum B). All of the defendants appealed the federal court's grant of 
injunctive relief to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which Court has, in 
turn certified a single question of state law to this Court. See Add. A, 
Course of Proceedings in the Federal Court 
In October 2008, the Plaintiff Association sued AG Shurtleff, and 
others, in federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief based on 
a Utah probate court's prior reformation of a religious charitable trust. 
Joint App. 469-502. The Association raised six claims for relief under Utah 
state and federal law. Later, the Association moved for a temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction against the probate court's 
ongoing trust administration. The Association did not immediately press its 
federal claims or request for an injunction, but it stayed those claims, in 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hopes the parties could resolve the underlying dispute. J t App. 1368-69. 
Settlement efforts failed, and the Association turned to this Court for 
relief, seeking an extraordinary writ that declared that the probate court's 
reformation and continued administration of the UEP Trust violated the 
Plaintiff Association's state and federal constitutional rights. After this 
Court's adverse ruling, the Association renewed its request in the federal 
court for injunctive relief. Jt. App. 1382-1429; 4035-52. AG Shurtleff 
moved to dismiss that request and filed an opposition memorandum. Jt. 
App. 1863-83; 3674-3702; 4001-57. 
At some point in those proceedings, the federal court called for 
c_ 
supplemental briefing on the res judicata effect of this Court's laches 
determination and order dismissing the Association's petition for 
extraordinary relief. The federal court heard oral argument, and in written 
decision issued February 24, 2011, the federal court determined this Court's 
prior laches determination was not a judgment "on the merits" and therefore 
did not bar the Association's federal claims. The Court therefore granted a 
preliminary injunction. Jt. App. 22-69. 
AG Shurtleff appealed that order. Jt. App. 4786-4788. On August 1, 
2011, AG Shurtleff moved the Tenth Circuit to certify a question of state 
5 
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law to this Court, and submitted his opening brief on that federal appeal. In 
pertinent part, AG Shurtleff asked the Tenth Circuit to certify 
the legal question [of] whether the previous dismissal of the 
Plaintiff Association's constitutional challenge to the trust's 
reformation based on laches has claim-preclusive effects in a 
subsequent case or whether it has issue-preclusive effects on a 
laches defense in a subsequent challenge to the trust's reformation 
Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff s Motion to Certify Question of State 
Law. 
The Tenth Circuit did not immediately grant that motion, but called 
for full-briefing and set the matter for oral argument. On the eve of oral 
argument, however, the Tenth Circuit changed course and certified a single 
question of Utah law to this Court. Order Certifying State Law Question, 
add. A. This Court accepted that question by order dated March 13, 2012. 
Course of Prior Proceedings in this Court. 
With its federal action stayed, in October 2009, the Association filed 
• . ••• i 
a petition for extraordinary writ in this Court. That petition challenged the 
probate court's reformation and continued administration of the UEP Trust 
on grounds similar to those raised in the Association's federal complaint. 
After review of the probate court's file, briefing by the parties, and oral 
6 
t 
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argument, this Court dismissed the petition in a written opinion. Citing the 
equitable doctrine of laches, this Court denied the Association's petition. 
See Lindberg, 2010 UT 51. 
Statement of the Facts 
The FLDS Church takes its roots from the religion established by 
Joseph Smith in April 1830, That religion is formally called The Church of 
Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, but is commonly referred to as • 
"Mormons." The FLDS Church is a fundamentalist off-shoot that continues 
to openly practice polygamy and to commingle and hold its assets. Jt. App. 
23-24. 
In 1942, FLDS Church leaders established a trust called the United 
Effort Plan (UEP or trust). And according to its doctrine, church members 
were to contribute to and to receive benefits from the trust. In the 1990s, 
church leaders reformed the trust in response to a decision from this Court 
that held the 1942 trust was not a charitable trust. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 
P.2d 1234, 1252 (Utah 1998); Jt. App. 24-25. 
In 2004, two tort lawsuits were filed against then-church president 
Warren Jeffs, the UEP, the FLDS Church, and others. Jeffs and his fellow 
trustees failed to respond to those suit, and those affiliated with the church 
7 
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were told to do nothing. Consequently, the UEP was not defended against 
the tort claims and defaults were entered against it and the other, named 
defendants. Jt. App. 24-25; 2057-3058, 
In 2005, AG Shurtleff filed a petition in a Utah probate court, seeking 
to remove or suspends the UEP trustees. Jt. App. 28-29; see In the Matter 
of the United Effort Plan Trust, Case No. 053900848. The probate court 
appointed a special fiduciary, and subsequently reformed the trust. Under 
those orders, the fiduciary administered the UEP, protected trust assets and 
paid taxes as necessary to meet the needs of the beneficiaries. Jt. App. 29. 
The order finalizing the reformed trust was entered in October 2006. Jt. 
App. 30-31. 
At no time during these early proceedings did the Plaintiff 
Association, FLDS church leaders, or any of the trust's prior trustees 
respond to or appear in the state probate matter. Jt. App. 29. Nearly two 
years after the reformed trust was finalized, and the special fiduciary 
announced his intent to sell certain of the trust assets to satisfy trust debts, 
the Plaintiff Association finally responded. Jt. App. 33-24. < 
Almost simultaneously, in October 2008, several Association 
. • • • • • • ; ; . V ; •• ''••>:•••••• ' , . . — • • ^ . : - - v : . • • : • ; ; ; , • • . - • • ' - v ; • • • • • • . . . . . ; , : . - - • \ : • • • • . - . { 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
members moved to intervene in the state probate case1 and also filed suit in 
the federal district court, Jt. Ap. 469-502. The federal court stayed the case 
for settlement, but that failed. Jt. App. 1368-69. The Plaintiff Association 
and AG Shurtleff reached agreement, but the other parties objected, and the 
probate court refused to accept the agreement. Jt. App. 1359-1367. 
Then, in October 2009, the Association petitioned this Court for 
extraordinary relief In the action here, the Association raised, briefed and 
argued the same constitutional issues that it raised, but had not then briefed 
or argued in the federal district court. Jt. App. 446-502. This Court, in turn, 
exercised its discretion to consider the Association's petition, and called for 
and considered full briefing and oral argument. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51. 
Ultimately, this Court denied the petition as barred by laches because the 
1
 On July 17, 2009, the probate court denied the Association 
member's motion to intervene and it appealed that order here. The matter 
was briefed and argued on the merits, and taken under advisement pending 
decision. Then, on March 8, 2011, in recognition of the fact the federal 
court's preliminary injunction order contradicted this Court's order in 
Lindbergh the Court called for supplemental briefing in that case to answer 
questions closely related to the one raised here. Jt. App. 4701-02. AG 
Shurtleff and others timely submitted their supplemental briefs in March 
2011 and this court held oral argument the following month. This Court has 
not yet issued a decision in the main appeal or in answer to the Court's own 
supplemental questions. But in June 2011, the Court stayed that case 
pending a decision from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Supreme 
Court Case No. 20091006; see also companion case no. 20090961. 
9 
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Association had waited nearly four years to asserts its claims, and because 
during that time many individuals had changed their positions in direct 
reliance on the probate court decisions entered during that protracted period 
of silence. Id. at ffll,30. 
This Court noted that laches is comprised of two parts: "(1) a party's 
lack of diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that lack of diligence," id. 
at f 27, and summarized that the doctrine bars a party from moving forward 
if the face of" a delay that works a disadvantage to another." Id. 
Respecting the Association's lack of diligence, this Court concluded: 
Because of the three-year delay in the face of invitations by 
the [probate] court to participate, and because this delay did 
not occur under circumstances that might excuse it, such as 
prompt negotiations aimed at avoiding litigation, or under 
circumstances that might make us otherwise hesitant to 
apply the doctrine of laches, the FLDS Association has 
demonstrated a lack of diligence in filing this petition. 
id,i32. :\;;: 
And respecting the injuries to other parties, the Court recalled that 
[i]n the meantime, the Special Fiduciary reasonably relied 
on the presumptively valid appointment and reformation 
orders. He has made choices over the years, many expressly < 
approved by [the probate court], that cannot be undone. He 
has incurred irrevocable obligations and expenses for the 
Trust during the last four years. Other interested persons, 
including Trust participants who are not members of the 
10 
i 
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Petitioner association, have also made irreversible decisions 
and changed their positions based on these unappealed and 
heretofore unchallenged final orders. 
M , f 3 3 . 
On those findings, this Court concluded: 
In sum, many individuals have relied upon the [probate] 
court's final order from over three years ago, and the FLDS 
Association has given no adequate explanation for its delay 
in appealing or otherwise petitioning for relief The FLDS 
•. Association has shown a lack of diligence in challenging the 
modification of the Trust, and this lack of diligence has 
operated to the detriment of others. The FLDS Association 
offers no adequate explanation for its delay and no other 
circumstances exist that might make us otherwise hesitant to 
apply laches. Accordingly, we dismiss the FLDS 
Association's Trust modification claims pursuant to the 
doctrine of laches. 
Summary of the Argument 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has asked this Court to determine 
whether its prior decision that dismissed a petition for extraordinary relief 
and held the Plaintiff Association's constitutional claims were barred by 
laches is entitled to be given res judicata, or preclusive effect. That 
decision, AG Shurtleff submits, is entitled to both claim and issue 
preclusion as a matter of Utah law. 
11 
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In the prior action, this Court reviewed a voluminous record, the 
parties' briefs, and heard oral argument. Too, the Court found facts 
supporting its laches determination. On those facts, and recognizing still, 
the seriousness of the Plaintiff Association's claims, this Court determined 
that based on the Plaintiff Association's lack of diligence in challenging the 
Trust orders, and because that lack of diligence had operated to the 
detriment of other, laches barred the door. 
That conclusion, and the 19-page written opinion in which it is 
contained, carry the indicia of finality. That conclusion, and the findings 
that underlay it, constitute final decisions "on the merits" of the laches 
defense. That conclusion, therefore, has res judicata effect and bars 
subsequent adjudication of the Association's claims and causes of action. 
This Court should therefore affirm the question now before it. 
< 
12 
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Argument 
On March 13, 2012, this Court accepted a single certified question 
that asks: 
Under Utah preclusion law, is the Utah Supreme Court's 
discretionary review of a petition for extraordinary writ and 
subsequent dismissal on laches grounds a decision "on the merits" 
when it is accompanied by a written opinion, such that later 
adjudication of the same claim is barred? 
AG Shurtleff affirmatively answers that question in the sections that 
follow. Preliminarily, AG shurtleff restates the underlying legal principles 
helpful to the Court's analysis. 
Background. 
Res judicata - Utah's preclusion law. 
The doctrine of res judicata, or Utah's preclusion law, embraces two 
distinct branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Mack v. Utah 
Dep 't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47,f29, 221 P.3d 194. Both branches are 
"premised on the principle that a controversy should be adjudicated only 
once." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under claim 
preclusion, a court's prior decision precludes subsequent adjudication of the 
same controversy when: (1) each case involves the same parties or their 
privies; (2) the precluded claim was presented in the first suit or was a claim 
13 
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that could or should have been raised in that action; and (3) the first suit 
resulted in a final decision on the merits. Id.; accord Press Pub., Ltd. v. 
MatolBotanicalInt'l, Ltd., 2001 UT 106, 1 19, 37 P.2d 1121. 
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, "prevents parties or their 
privies from relitigating facts and issues in [a] second suit that were fully 
litigated in the first suit." Macris & Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 
93, f. 19, 16 P.3d 1214. A party prevails under issue preclusion when: (1) 
the challenged issue is identical in the previous action as in the one at hand; 
(2) the issue was decided in the prior action by a final decision on the 
merits; (3) the parties had the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the 
issue in the previous action; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is 
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the first action. Id, at f 37; 
accord Brigham Young Univ. v, Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, t 
27, 110P.3d678. 
Both branches of Utah's preclusion law serve an "important judicial 
function" and prevent "issues once litigated from being relitigated." Penrod 
v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). Both 
branches, then, promote judicial economy and foster predictability by 
14 
i 
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freeing parties from the burden of relitigation and preventing needless 
litigation. 
The Affirmative Defense of Laches. 
Laches is a "delay that works a disadvantage to another." 
Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs,, 535 P.2d 
1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). The doctrine contains two elements: one party's 
lack of diligence, and injury to another party as result. See Angelos v. First 
Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983). Whether laches may 
appropriately apply is circumstantial: 
The length of time that constitutes a lack of diligence 
'depend[s] on the circumstances of each case,' because 'the 
propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon the 
gravity of the prejudice suffered . . . and the length of [the] 
delay.' 
Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, % 28 (quoting Papanikolas Bros., 535 P.2d at 1260.) 
Whether to apply laches, therefore, looks to "the relative harm caused by the 
petitioner's delay, the relative harm to the petitioner, and whether or not the 
respondent acted in good faith." Id. 
The certified question focuses on whether, under either preclusive 
branch, this Court's laches decision constituted a final decision "on the 
merits" such that later adjudication by the Association on either the 
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previously dismissed claims or the underlying issues is barred. AG 
Shurtleff urges this Court to confirm that question. 
Discussion. 
THIS COURT'S WRITTEN OPINION DISMISSING THE 
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF ON 
LACHES CONSTITUTES A FINAL DECISION ON THE 
MERITS SUFFICIENT TO PRECLUDE SUBSEQUENT 
ADJUDICATION. 
No statute of limitations pertains to a claim for extraordinary relief. 
But such claims "should be filed within a reasonable time after the act 
complained of has been done or refused." Renn v. Utah State Bd. of 
Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 684 (Utah 1995). By waiting too long to petition 
for extraordinary relief, this Court has held, a party may be barred by laches. 
Id. ("[T[he equitable doctrine of laches is available to dismiss untimely 
writs.") 
Close scrutiny of this Court's Lindberg decision, reveals the Court 
carefully considered both the factual circumstances and the legal elements 
essential to grant or deny a laches defense. When the Association's petition 
was then before it, this Court carefully weighed the gravity of the alleged 
prejudice the Plaintiff Association and the gravity of the harm to the 
respondents were to this Court to simply overlook Plaintiffs delay. 
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Namely, the Court reviewed the voluminous trial court record, it received 
and read closely the briefs submitted by the several parties, and it 
entertained oral argument. 
Thereafter, the Court dismissed the Association's petition in a 19 
page, detailed, written opinion. That opinion recited the case's procedural 
background flfif 2-18), it detailed the Association's claims and substantive 
allegations (ffl 19-22, 25), and the opinion analyzed the length, reasons for 
and, reliance created by the Association's protracted delay (fflf 30-35). And 
though declining, therefore, to adjudicate the substance of the Association's 
underlying claims, this Court's dismissal for laches constitutes a decision on 
the merits that bars the Association's subsequent claims. 
A. A Decision Need Not Resolve the Substantive Claims 
to Bar a Subsequent Adjudication. 
A case need not proceed to trial to result in a judgment "on the 
merits." But that phrase constitutes a "term of art," D.D.A. v Utah, 2009 UT 
83, TJ 37, 222 P.3d 1172 (citation omitted), that signifies a decision rendered 
after a court has evaluated the relevant evidence and the substantive 
arguments. See Black's Law Dictionary 1117 (7th ed. 1999). A decision on 
the merits may be made at any stage of the litigation, so long as it reflects a 
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proper application of the law to the facts. See Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 
2002 UT 6, Tf 42 n. 6, 44 P.3d 663. When a court applies governing law to a 
case's facts to dispose of the case, it has rendered a judgment "on the 
merits." Id. :;V:v': ' : 
An .evidentiary hearing is not required to dispose a claim, but a 
judgment on the merits may be rendered at any stage of litigation. See 
Miller, 2002 UT 6, \ 42 n.6; Dairies v. Vasquez 2003 UT App. 168, ^  8, 72 
P.3d 135. Likewise, "[i]t is a misconception of res judicata to assume that 
the doctrine does not come intd operation if a court has hot passed on the 
'merits'" . . . of the ultimate substantive issue of litigation." Angel v. 
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 190 (1947). It is settled, instead, that "[a]n 
adjudication declining to reach such ultimate substantive issues may bar a 
second attempt to reach them in another court." Id.; see also 18A Charles 
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 443 5 
(2d ed.) ("[Ojn the merits" is "an unfortunate phrase, which could easily 
distract attention frm the fundamental characteristics that entitle a judgment 
to greater or lesser preclusive effects"). But because a court may dispose of 
the "merits" of a claim when it refuses the claim enforcement, a final 
judgment addressing the substantive claim need not pertain. Angel, 330 U.S. 
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at 190. 
On this point, AG Shurtleff points to cases holding that a decision that 
dismisses a cause of action based on the running of the applicable statute of 
limitations, constitutes a final decision on the merits sufficient to bar 
relitigation of the same issue or claim. In Murphy v. Klein Tools, Inc., 935 
F.2d 1127, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 1991), applying Federal Rule 41(b), the Tenth 
Circuit held that a case dismissed based on statute of limitation constituted a 
judgment on the merits.2 And in State v. Cahoon, 2009 UT 9, 203 P.3d 957 
(Utah 2009), this Court determined that "collateral estoppel prevented] the 
government from bringing identical charges against a defendant [when] the 
original charges were dismissed for violating the statute of limitations." Id, 
2009 UT 9, f 14 (quoting United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 .US; 85, 87 
(1916)) ("A plea of the statute of limitations is a plea to the merits,.. . and 
however this issue was raised in the former case, after judgment upon it, it 
could not be reopened in a later prosecution."). 
2
 Because the language of each rule is nearly identical, the Tenth 
Circuit's decision in Klein can guide this Court's application of Utah Rule 
41(b) to the Court's involuntary dismissal of the Association's petition 
based on laches. See Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, LLC, 2010 
40, Tf 16, 238 P.3d 1035. There is no principled basis for distinguishing 
between two defenses (or any other, successful affirmative defense), when 
determining the preclusive effect of a prior dismissal. 
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Of equal note, "[sjeveral federal decisions follow the clearly correct 
rule that dismissal of a prior action as barred by the statute of limitations 
precludes a second action on the same claim in the same system of courts." 
18 A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4441. (Emphasis 
added). "The same rule," those courts maintain, "applies to a dismissal on 
such analogous theories as laches or undue delay." Id; see Smith v. City of 
Chicago, 820 F.2d 916-918-19 (7th Cir. 1987) (in a "classic case for res 
judicata," appellate court affirmed trial court's dismissal on laches as a 
decision "on the merits" sufficient to bar section 1983 claim on the same 
claim); see also Paxtonv. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(holding challenge to 30 year-old conviction that trial court dismissed as 
barred by laches, an adjudication "on the merits" that precluded relitigation). 
Finally, in an action challenging dismissal of a cause of action under civil 
rule 12(b)(6) for the moving party's failure to state a claim for relief, this 
Court easily held that the trial court's order constituted "a dismissal on the 
merits and is accorded res judicata effect." Mack, 2009 UT 47, \ 29 
(quoting 2A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 12.07 
(2d. Ed. Supp. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
When the phrase is given its proper meaning, Lindberg constitutes a 
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decision "on. the merits." The decision explains in detail the background 
facts, it recites the probates court's actions giving rise to the Association's 
claims, and states the nature and seriousness of those claims. Then, after 
thoroughly examining the asserted laches defense and its application of 
those facts, the decision holds that laches bars further consideration of the 
Association's petition. When viewed in that light and by any measure, 
Lindberg constitutes a final judgment on the merits - it is a considered 
decision based on "the elements or grounds of a claim or defense. " Dairiesv 
2008 UT 51, 1f 46 (emphasis added). 
And to the extent they differ from this conclusion, the cases cited with 
concern by the Tenth Circuit on page 13 of its certification order are easily 
dispatched. First, correctly quoting from Day v. Wis all's Estate, 381 P.2d 
220 (Ariz. 1963), the Tenth Circuit suggests that laches applies only after a 
court first considers the merits of the underlying suit. A plain reading of that 
case, however, reveals that in Day, the court was not concerned with the 
"circumstances and merit" of the underlying claim, but with the merits of the 
trial court's prior application of the laches defense to the particular facts of 
that case. Id, 381 P.2d 220. Rather than detract from AG Shurtleff s 
position, Day supports it. Even under that case, a judgment that bars a claim 
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based on a party's delay constitutes a judgment on the merits entitled to res 
judicata effect.3 
Johnson v. City ofLoma Linda, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 316, 99 P.3d 874 
(Cal. 2000) is similarly distinguished on its own facts. There, Johnson, a 
terminated city employee, sued the city for alleged sexual discrimination. A 
personnel board that reviewed Johnson's grievance disagreed and rejected 
the claim. Johnson later filed suit. On appeal to the California Supreme 
Court, that court determined that Johnson's subsequent suit challenging the 
3
 That interpretation of Day is also consistent with the Arizona 
Supreme Court's more recent explanation of the phrase "judgment on the 
merits": 
[CJourts often describe a judgement as being'on 
the merits' if it finally resolves an action in a 
manner that precludes later relitigation of the 
claims involved. See, e.g., Gould v. Soto, 14 Ariz. 
558, 561-62, 133 P. 410, 411-12 (1913); 
Restatement (Second) of Judgements . . . § 19 cmt. 
A (1982). Such a judgment may result from an 
actual trial on the substantive issues but it need not 
do so. 
A judgment may also be 'on the merits' and 
thus have claim preclusive effect when it results 
from the stipulation of the parties or various pre-
trial rulings. 
4501 NorthpointLP v. Maricopa County, 128 P.3d 215, 218 (Ariz. 2006) 
(en banc). 
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personnel board's determinations was barred by laches. The court 
determined, however, that laches did not bar Johnson's Title VII claim. But 
citing to United States Supreme Court authority, the California court stated: 
"Title VII claims are not precluded by administrative decision that have not 
been judicially reviewed on the merits." Id. at 327. Thus, because the trial 
court did not review the personnel board's findings on their merits, its 
judgment did not bar Johnson's Title VII claim. Here, this Court is 
presented with neither similar facts, nor law. Johnson, therefore, is 
inconsequential. 
Because this Court disposed of the merits of the Plaintiff 
Association's claims " when they [were] refused enforcement," this Court's 
decision in Lindberg constitutes a decision "on the merits." Angel, 330 U.S. 
at 190. To conclude otherwise, defeats the purpose that Utah's preclusion 
law is intended to promote. See Nu Creme Creations, 669 P.2d 873, 875 
(Utah 1983) (res judicata serves an "important judicial policy" by 
"preventing issues once litigated from being relitigated.") The Court should 
therefore confirm the certified question. 
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B. This Court Dismissed the Association's Petition on 
the Merits of the Laches Defense, Not Merely as an 
Exercise of the Court's Rule 65B Discretion. 
In the text of the certified question and also in the colloquy that 
accompanied it, the Tenth Circuit has placed curious emphasis on this 
Court's use of the term "discretionary." Giving, perhaps, more breadth to its 
concern, at page 14 of its Certifying Order, the Tenth Circuit asked "If a 
party is barred by laches from obtaining discretionary and extraordinary 
relief, does it necessarily follow that laches would apply of the same force to 
a claim invoking a court's mandatory jurisdiction?" AG Shurtleff submits 
that is a distinction without a difference. 
In the absence of any "other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy," 
civil rule 65B entitles a person "to petition the court for extraordinary 
relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a).4 Whether to grant a party extraordinary 
relief rests in the Court's discretion. See State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, fflf. 
7-8, 204 P.3d 104; State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, f 23, 127 P.3d 682. That 
grant of discretion, however, does not disturb or nullify the application of 
4
 Under rule 65B, a court may grant a petitioner any remedy that was 
available at common law, including certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, 
prohibition, or habeas corpus. See Renn, 904 P.2d at 682-83, n. 3. 
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res judicata to a decision to grant or deny extraordinary relief. But adhering 
to the nature of the proceeding and the basis of the court's decision, res 
judicata may apply to a decision to dismiss a petition for extraordinary relief, 
just as to any other decision. Accord State ex rel Kopchak v. Lime, 335 
N.E.2d 700 (Ohio 1975) (prior order denying petition for writ of mandamus 
entitled to preclusive application); State ex, rel Campo v. Osborn, 10 A.2d 
687 (Conn. 1940) (same); Kaufman v. Goldman, 132 N.E.2d 52 (111. 1956) 
(same); Lawrence v. Corbeille, 178 P. 834 (Idaho 1919) (prior order 
granting mandamus given preclusive effect). See generally, E.T. Tsai, 
Annotation, Judgment Granting or Denying Writ of Mandamus or 
Prohibition as Res Judicata, 21 A.L.R.3d 206, §§ 2-9 (1968 & Cum. Supp.) 
(uIt is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to a judgment 
in mandamus and prohibition proceedings, that is, that the special character 
of these proceedings does not, ipso facto, preclude a judgment rendered 
therein from operating as res judicata in another action or proceeding.") A 
review of this Court's prior decisions, makes that clear. 
In a sparsely worded opinion, this Court recognized in Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705 (Utah 1978), that where a 
court denied a petition for extraordinary relief without an opinion, and under 
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circumstances "consistent with the view the court merely refused to exercise 
its original jurisdiction, o r . . . was of the opinion an extraordinary writ was 
not a proper remedy," denial of that writ was "not res judicata." Id, 575 
P.2d at 708, But in Gates v. Taylor, 2000 UT 33, 997 P.2d 903 (per curiam), 
this Court gave preclusive effect to a court of appeals' prior denial of a 65B 
petition.-' 
There, the Court recognized that where the Court of Appeals denied, 
the petition in a written opinion that made clear "the matter was decided on 
the merits," the doctrine of res judicata barred the petitioner "from seeking 
the same relief." Gates, 2000 UT 33, ffl|l-2. "Sound policy, principles of 
judicial economy, and fairness to the parties," this Court held, "requires that 
final judgments on the merits be subject only to proper appellate review and 
not to successive relitigation in new courts." Id. ^ 3. But "'[w]hen a court 
of competent jurisdiction ha[s] adjudicated directly upon a particular 
matter,"this Court continued, "the same point is not open to inquiry in a 
subsequent action for the same cause and between the same parties."' Id. 
(quoting Cohnv. Isnesse, 45 Cal. App. 509, 188 P. 278 (1920)). This 
Court's reasoning is clear: a written opinion that examines the merits of the 
Court's substantive decision to deny a discretionary writ bars later 
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relitigation of the same issues between the same parties. 
Here, the Court denied the Association's request for extraordinary 
relief, not for reasons inherent in Rules 65B, or because the petition was 
jurisdictionally infirm. But this Court exercised its discretion and barred the 
Association's petition based on the merits of laches, not a remedial 
consideration. 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure makes that clear; 
(d) Review and disposition of petition. The court shall render 
a decision based on the petition and any timely response, or it 
may require briefing or the submission of further information, 
and may hold oral argument at its discretion. 
Utah R. App. P. 19(d). Under this rule, the Court could have chosen to 
decline the Association's petition based on the petition and responses, in a 
brief per curiam decision, issued without comment. It did not. 
Instead, as an exercise of this Court's discretion, the Court called for 
full briefing and oral argument. The Court took control of the probate 
court's case file. And then, on review of the briefs, oral argument, and the 
contents of the case file, the Court issued its lengthy decision on the merits 
of an articulated affirmative defense. 
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The simple fact that before doing so, this Court possessed the 
discretion to dispose of the Association's petition on procedural grounds, or 
with no analysis, is of no event. Once this Court exercised its discretion to 
receive and thus to entertain not only the substance of the petition, but the 
strength of the affirmative defense, it behaved just as a court conducting a 
mandatory review might behave. 
And curiously, to accept that a decision issued by a court exercising 
its discretionary review is entitled to no precedent or lasting effect, puts in 
jeopardy more than one hundred years of this Court's settled jurisprudence. 
Just as this Court possesses the discretion to entertain - or not- a petition for 
extraordinary review, filed as an original action in this Court, the Court also 
possesses the discretion to grant certiorari to the class of cases that come to 
it outside the scope of this Court's exclusive jurisdiction. 
If the lasting impact of court's order is dependant, or not, on whether 
the court exercised discretionary review, this Court's common law would be 
of no value. Such a consequence is untoward and unintended. The Tenth 
Circuit's emphasis, then, on discretionary review is misplaced. This Court 
should affirm the certified question. 
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Conclusion 
The answer that AG Shurtleff urges is consistent with the law and 
also, consistent with was this Court actually did when it decided Lindberg, 
Namely, the Court gave the Plaintiff Association its "day in court" to 
challenge the probate court's reformation of the UEP Trust. The Court 
granted the Association full briefing, it considered its oral argument, and 
weighed the seriousness of the Association's claims. But it did so, however, 
against the backdrop of an affirmative defense. And after considering the 
Association's claims, this Court determined that the affirmative defense of 
laches barred the door. Once asserted, this Court was not free to ignore that 
affirmative defense, but was bound, instead, to consider it. This Court's 
written decision, therefore, dismissing the Association's discretionary 
petition for extraordinary relief on the merits of that laches defense must 
preclude subsequent reconsideration of the same claims or issues in another 
court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 20th April, 2012, 
BRIDGET K. ROMANO 
Utah Solicitor General 
Attorney for Utah Attorney General Mark L. 
Shurtleff 
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the United Effort Plan Trust; MARK L. 
SHURTLEFF, Attorney General for the 
State of Utah; DENISE POSSE 
LINDBERG, Judge ofthe Third Judicial 
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and 
RICHARD JESSOP REAM; THOMAS 
SAMUEL STEED, DON RONALD 
FISCHER; DEAN JOSEPH BARLOW; 
WALTER SCOTT FISCHER; RICHARD 
GILBERT; BRENT JEFFS, 
Intervenors, 
and 
HARKER DAIRY FARM; JONATHAN 
HARKER, 
Movants. 
FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, an Association of Individuals, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
BRUCE R. WIS AN, Special Fiduciary of 
the United Effort Plan Trust; MARK L. 
SHURTLEFF, Attorney General for the 
State of Utah; THOMAS C. HORNE, 
Attorney General for the State of Arizona; 
DENISE POSSE LINDBERG, Judge of 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, 
Defendants, 
and 
RICHARD JESSOP REAM; THOMAS 
SAMUEL STEED; DON RONALD 
FISCHER; DEAN JOSEPH BARLOW; 
11-4072 
(D. C. No. 2:08-CV-00772-DB) 
(D. Utah) 
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WALTER SCOTT FISCHER; RICHARD 
GILBERT; BRENT JEFFS, 
Intervenors-Appellants. 
FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, an Association of Individuals, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 11-4076 
BRUCE R. WISAN, Special Fiduciary of (D. C. No. 2:08-CV-00772-DB) 
the United Effort Plan Trust, (D.Utah) 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Attorney 
General for the State of Utah; THOMAS 
C. HORNE, Attorney General for the 
State of Arizona; DENISE POSSE 
LINDBERG, Judge of the Third Judicial 




RICHARD JESSOP REAM; THOMAS 
SAMUEL STEED; DON RONALD 
FISCHER; DEAN JOSEPH BARLOW; 
WALTER SCOTT FISCHER; RICHARD 
GILBERT; BRENT JEFFS, 
Defendants-Intervenors. 
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Before BRISCOE, Chief Circuit Judge. 
These matters are before the court to grant the pending motions to certify questions 
of state law and to vacate the oral argument hearing currently set for March 20, 2012. On 
July 29 and August 1, 2011, respectively, the Arizona Attorney General, the Utah 
Attorney General and Judge Denise Posse Lindberg and Bruce R. Wisan filed motions to 
certify questions of state law. The intervenors filed a notice of joinder with respect to 
those motions on August 2, 2011. On October 27, 2011, the appellee filed a response in 
opposition, and the various appellants filed replies in support. 
We have reviewed carefully all of these materials and, upon consideration, grant 
the motions. The panel of judges assigned to review these appeals will issue a subsequent 
order outlining with specificity the issues which will be certified. That order will be 
forwarded to the Utah Supreme Court. 
In light of our decision to grant these requests, we vacate the scheduled oral 
argument hearing and excuse all counsel from attendance. In addition, we deny as moot 
the intervenors' pending motion for additional oral argument time. 
Entered for the Court, 
" ^ L s ^ W ^ t ^ ^ ^^ ^ 
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER 
Clerk of Court 
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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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DURRANT. Associate Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
%1 This case concerns the United Effort Plan Trust ("UEP 
Trust" or "Trust")--a trust originally formed in 1942 by what 
petitioners characterize as a fundamentalist religious group that 
was the predecessor of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints, The Trust was modified in 1998 so that it 
qualified as a charitable trust under Utah law. In 2006, the 
Utah Third District Court issued an order that modified the Trust 
again. This order was not appealed or otherwise challenged for 
nearly three years. In a petition for extraordinary writ, an 
association of members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the "FLDS Association")1 challenges 
the district court's modification and subsequent administration 
of this Trust as unconstitutional and in violation of Utah law. 
We hold that because the FLDS Association has delayed this 
challenge for nearly three years, and because during this time, 
many parties have engaged in numerous transactions in reliance on 
the Trust's modification, the FLDS Association's trust 
modification claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of 
laches. We also hold that all of the FLDS Association's 
remaining claims regarding trust administration, except one, are 
also barred by laches because they involve the same delay and 
prejudice as the modification claim. This claim that is not 
barred by laches is barred because it is not ripe for 
adjudication. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 In 1942, the spiritual leadership of a fundamentalist 
religious movement called the "Priesthood Work" formed the United 
Effort Plan Trust. The UEP Trust stated that its purpose was 
"charitable and philanthropic," but conditioned membership in the 
Trust upon "consecration" of real and mixed property to the 
Trust. For this fundamentalist group--predecessors of the 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the 
"FLDS Church" or "Church")--consecration was an act of faith 
whereby members deeded their property to the UEP Trust to be 
managed by Church leaders. Church leaders, who were also 
1
 The FLDS Association currently petitioning is not the FLDS 
Church, nor the corporation of that church's president. Rather, 
the association describes itself as "The Fundamentalist Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, an association of 
individuals." 
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trustees, then used this property to minister to the needs of the 
members. 
f3 In 1986, some Trust property residents sued the UEP 
trustees for breach of fiduciary duty. The district court 
rejected those claims, finding that since the UEP Trust was 
charitable rather than private, the plaintiffs lacked standing to 
sue. In 1998, we reversed the district court's holding that the 
Trust was charitable.2 We first noted that charitable trusts 
differ from private trusts because "xin a private trust [,] 
property is devoted to the use of specified persons who are 
designated as beneficiaries of the trust; whereas a charitable 
trust has as a beneficiary a definite class and indefinite 
beneficiaries within the definite class, and the purpose is 
beneficial to the community.' "3 We then found that the UEP Trust 
was not a charitable trust because it was intended, from its 
inception, to benefit specified persons, namely the Trust's 
founders.4 
f4 In response to our decision, Rulon Jeffs, the sole 
surviving founder and beneficiary of the 1942 Trust, acting for 
himself and also in his capacity as president and Corporation 
Sole of the FLDS Church, along with the other trustees, executed 
the "Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust of the United 
Effort Plan" (the Xl1998 Restatement"). It is not disputed that 
the 1998 Restatement of the 1942 UEP Trust qualifies as a 
charitable trust. It broadened the class of beneficiaries beyond 
the founders of the Trust to all of those who "consecrate their 
lives, time[], talents, and resources to the building and 
establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth under the direction 
of the President of the [FLDS] church." The 1998 Restatement 
provided that uin the event of termination of this Trust, whether 
by the Board of Trustees or by reason of law, the assets of the 
Trust Estate at that time shall become the property of the 
Corporation of the President of the [FLDS Church]." 
fl5 In 2004, then-FLDS Church president, Warren Jeffs, the 
Trust, and the FLDS Church were sued in two separate tort 
actions: the first action alleged child sexual abuse, assault, 
and fraud primarily against Warren Jeffs; the second alleged 
2
 Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Utah 1998). 
3
 Id. at 1252 (emphasis added) (quoting Olivas v. Bd. of 
Nat'l Missions of Presbyterian Church, 405 P.2d 481, 485 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1965)). 
-
 4
 IcL. at 1252-53. 
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civil conspiracy, fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, and other 
torts against Warren Jeffs, the FLDS Church, and the Trust. 
Rodney Parker of the law firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
served as attorney for the Trust and the FLDS Church in these 
actions until he withdrew because his clients insisted upon a 
course of conduct with which he fundamentally disagreed, and 
because his clients had discharged him. Warren Jeffs, as 
controlling trustee, did not appoint a substitute attorney to 
defend the Trust in the litigation, leaving the Trust vulnerable 
to default judgments against it. 
U6 With this concern in mind, Mr. Parker filed motions in 
the district court asking the court to give notice to the Utah 
Attorney General ("Utah AG") and the Trust land residents before 
entering a default judgment against the Trust. In response, the 
Utah AG petitioned the district court for (1) removal of the 
trustees for breach of fiduciary duty; (2) an order compelling 
Warren Jeffs and the other trustees to appear and file an 
inventory^ final report, and accounting of the administration of 
the Trust; and (3) appointment of a special fiduciary to serve 
until new trustees were appointed. The Utah AG's petition was 
filed in May 2005. Personal service was made on those trustees 
who could be found. Trustees who could not be served personally 
were served via substitute service, Publications were made where 
Trust participants resided. 
f7 In a June 2005 preliminary injunction, the district 
court suspended the trustees and appointed a special fiduciary 
for the Trust. The special fiduciary's powers and authority were 
outlined in various district court orders. The district court 
gave the special fiduciary authority to act on behalf of the 
Trust. The district court also ordered the suspended trustees to 
prepare an accounting, deliver records, and cooperate with the 
fiduciary, but the suspended trustees failed to comply with this 
order. The district court asked the special fiduciary to prepare 
a memorandum identifying issues the court needed to address 
before appointing new trustees. Ultimately, the special 
fiduciary expressed concern in a memorandum filed with the 
district court that the Trust needed to be reformed if new 
trustees were to be appointed. 
1)8 On December 13, 2005, the district court entered an 
order that concluded the Trust could be reformed so that the 
special fiduciary could administer the Trust to meet the "just 
wants and needs" of the beneficiaries according to neutral, 
nonreligious principles. The district court cited Utah Code 
section 75-7-413 as its authority to use the doctrine of cy pres 
to modify the Trust. Cy pres is a common-law doctrine, now 
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adopted by statute in Utah Code section 75-7-413, that courts may 
apply when a charitable purpose of a trust "becomes unlawful, 
impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful."5 Rather than 
allowing the Trust to fail in these situations, under the common 
law, courts would apply the trust "%to other charitable objects 
lawful in their character, but corresponding, as near as may be 
to the original intention of the [settlor].'"6 The Utah Code's 
similar language allows a court faced with a trust whose purpose 
has become "unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or 
wasteful . . . to modify or terminate the trust by directing that 
the trust property be applied or distributed . . . in a manner 
consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes."7 
1f9 The district court listed two reasons for using cy pres 
toi reform the Trust. First, the court found that the trustees 
had breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudent trust 
administration. Second, it found several Trust provisions to be 
"fundamentally flawed and unworkable." 
flO The following three principles guided the district 
court's reformation of the Trust: First, the court would attempt 
to preserve the Trust's charitable intent. Second, the court 
would only give effect to the Trust's legitimate and legal 
purposes. Finally, the court would employ "neutral principles of 
law." 
til To meet its' first goal of preserving the Trust's 
charitable intent, the district court had to first identify that 
intent. It characterized the 1998 Restatement as having at least 
two purposes: first, the Trust was to advance the religious 
doctrines and goals of the FLDS Church; and second, the Trust was 
to provide for the just wants and needs of the FLDS Church 
members. The FLDS Association characterizes each of these goals 
as religious because participation in the Trust was conditioned 
upon living according to Church principles, with the president of 
the FLDS Church being the ultimate arbiter of individual 
righteousness. 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-413(1) (Supp. 2010); see also In re 
Gerber, 652 P.2d 937, 939-40 & n.4 (Utah 1982) (explaining the 
history of the common-law cy pres doctrine). 
6
 Gerber, 652 P.2d at 939 (quoting Late Corp. of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 
1, 56 (1890)). 
7
 Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-413 (1) (c). 
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UX2 Using the second of its principles--to give effect only 
to the Trust's legitimate and legal purposes--the district court 
held that it could reform the Trust by excising the purpose of 
advancing the religious doctrines and goals of the FLDS Church to 
the degree that any of these were illegal. As examples of 
illegal doctrines it could not sanction, the district court 
listed "polygamy, bigamy, [and] sexual activity between adults 
and minors." The court instead focused its reformation on 
preserving the Trust's goal of providing for the just wants and 
needs of Trust participants, which it held was a "lawful 
religious purpose[]." 
Hl3 Despite finding a "lawful religious purpose," the third 
of the district court's principles mandated that the court reform 
the Trust using "neutral principles." The court understood this 
to mean that it could not resolve property disputes on the basis 
of religious doctrine. The district court's memorandum decision 
states, 
[C]ourts are prohibited by the First 
Amendment from resolving "rights to the use 
and control of church property on the basis 
of a judicial determination that one group of 
> claimants has adhered faithfully to the 
fundamental faiths, doctrines and practices 
of the church . . . while the other group of 
claimants has departed substantially 
therefrom." In short, courts must separate 
that which is primarily ecclesiastical from 
that which is primarily secular, and must 
; : defer to ecclesiastical authority for 
ecclesiastical determinations. 
But the district court felt that if FLDS ecclesiastical leaders 
were able to make ecclesiastical determinations about who 
participated in the Trust, many former or disaffected members of 
the FLDS Church who consecrated property to the Trust "could be 
excluded from consideration notwithstanding their prior 
consecrations to the Trust." The district court found this 
unacceptable. It resolved that the Trust needed to be modified 
so that the role of ecclesiastical leaders would be to provide 
"non-binding input" to future trustees. These trustees would 
then use a neutral set of criteria and their own "good judgment"-
-informed but not bound by FLDS ecclesiastical advice--to 
determine the "just wants and needs" of the beneficiaries. 
fl4 Ultimately, the district court concluded that 
implementation of these principles would require modifying each 
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section of the Trust. These modifications included the 
following: stating that Trust property would only be used in 
furtherance of "legitimate Trust purposes" as identified by the 
court; allowing FLDS leaders to offer their nonbinding input, but 
granting the Board of Trustees the ultimate authority to 
determine who would be allowed to live on Trust property and what 
the Trust property residents' just wants and needs were; limiting 
the Board's power to order relocation or property sharing among 
Trust property residents to situations where the relocation 
arrangement was "necessary for legitimate Trust administration 
reasons"; and deleting or modifying the Trust's requirement that 
occupants of Trust land live according to Church doctrine. The 
goal of the district court was unambiguous: "A clear division 
must exist between the authority of the Board to act with respect 
to the Trust, and the authority of the priesthood to act with 
respect to the [FLDS Church] Plan." 
fl5 The district court decided that the Trust's third 
section would also need to be modified to strip the FLDS Church 
president of several powers under the Trust. First, the district 
court would remove any requirement that the president of the FLDS 
Church approve any Board action. Since the 1998 Restatement gave 
the FLDS Church president power to appoint and remove trustees, 
the district court invited interested parties to suggest Trust 
modifications that would allow for a different method of 
appointing and removing trustees. Second, the district court 
modified the Trust to remove the president of the Church as 
trustee and as president of the Board of Trustees. The court 
felt this modification was necessary because it had just 
suspended Warren Jeffs, the FLDS president, as a trustee and 
because it wanted to keep the Church and the Church Plan separate 
from the Trust. Finally, the district court found that a 
reversionary clause that would cause the Trust to revert to the 
FLDS president in the event of termination needed to be altered 
because the court had just suspended the FLDS president's 
trusteeship for violation of his fiduciary duties to Trust 
beneficiaries, and because, in the event of reversion, the Trust 
assets might be used to further illegal FLDS practices. 
fl6 In its order, the district court invited suggestions 
for reformation of the 1998 Restatement. It also formed an 
advisory board to aid the special fiduciary in administration of 
the Trust until trustees could be appointed. It was understood 
that the court would consider the members of the advisory board 
as candidates to become trustees. There were no active FLDS 
members on the advisory board. On October 25, 2006, the court 
entered an order reforming the Trust (the "2006 Reformed Trust"). 
This order was not appealed. 
7 No. 20090859 
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Ul7 The 2006 Reformed Trust contains over 175 paragraphs 
compared to seventeen in the 1998 Restatement. The FLDS 
Association complains that those who had sued the UEP Trust took 
the *laboring oar" in drafting the 2006 Reformed Trust, and that 
their goal was to transform the FLDS culture and to liberate a 
people they felt belonged to a dangerous cult. The FLDS 
Association also complains that the religious mission and purpose 
of the Trust have been removed--that what was "fundamentally a 
religious institution guided by divine inspiration" is now its 
"wholly secular mirror image." The FLDS Association feels that 
the 2006 Reformation suppresses the FLDS Church's role "as the 
spiritual and economic center of life in the communit[y]." 
1|l8 The district court has retained jurisdiction over the 
administration of the Trust. It has instituted a process that 
allows Trust participants to petition to have the houses they 
live in distributed to them. The district court has expressed in 
a hearing that FLDS Church members are free to deed their houses 
over to any religious leader of their choice following 
distribution. Over the four-and-a-half years of the special 
fiduciary's-.administration, he has filed numerous reports with 
the district court. Some of the challenges the special fiduciary 
has faced in administering the Trust include the fact that Trust 
property has not been subdivided and multiple residents often 
live on one tax parcel. These conditions have complicated 
liquidation and distribution of Trust property. For instance, 
because the Trust's real property consists of several large 
parcels of land often containing several residences, if one of a 
parcel's residents fails to pay taxes, the parcel's other 
residents could face tax liens even if they have paid their fair 
share. The special fiduciary also complains that the suspended 
trustees' failure to cooperate with him has caused the fiduciary 
to expend significant time and effort to obtain information and 
records about the Trust and its property and that he has incurred 
significant costs and expense in discovering this information. 
He further asserts that the suspended trustees have actively 
interfered with his administration of the Trust. 
1|19 But the FLDS Association, in turn, alleges that the 
district court and special fiduciary have engaged in religiously 
discriminatory behavior. The FLDS Association alleges that the 
special fiduciary has made numerous offensive and religiously 
discriminatory remarks, including characterizing FLDS Church 
leaders' determination of "just wants and needs" pursuant to 
scripture and revelation as the "whim of leadership," and 
"discriminating on the basis of religion"; referring to himself 
as the "State-Ordained Bishop" or "SOB" as a way of mocking the 
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FLDS faith; and describing the process of Trust administration as 
a "sociological and psychological war" with the FLDS Association. 
The FLDS Association also alleges that, despite claims to the 
contrary and due to a fear of creating a "UEP II," the district 
court and the special fiduciary plan to implement a religious 
test to distribute Trust assets that would award outright deeds 
to non-FLDS Trust participants, but would impose a spendthrift 
trust on any Trust participant likely to donate Trust 
distributions to the FLDS Church. 
f20 On October 20, 2009, the FLDS Association brought these 
allegations to this court in a petition for extraordinary writ, 
filed under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B. The petition asks 
this court to do the following: find that the district court's 
actions have violated FLDS Church members' First Amendment rights 
and their rights under Utah's constitution, declare that certain 
sections of Utah's Uniform Trust Code are unconstitutional as 
applied to the FLDS Association, enjoin the district court from 
taking further action in the underlying UEP Trust litigation, 
declare the district court's reformation of the Trust 
unconstitutional, terminate the reformed Trust, overturn the 
district court's authorization to sell certain Trust property-
deemed sacred by the FLDS Association, terminate the appointment 
of the special fiduciary, and provide any other appropriate 
relief. Willie Jessop, a representative of the FLDS Association 
and a member of the FLDS Church, filed an affidavit with this 
petition outlining FLDS religious beliefs and what are in his 
view intrusions by the district court and the special fiduciary 
into Mr. Jessop's practice of these beliefs. The FLDS 
Association has also filed a substantially similar lawsuit along 
with a substantially similar affidavit by Willie Jessop in 
federal district court. 
f21 The original interested individuals who sued the Trust 
in 2004 (the "Original Interested Individuals"), the Utah AG, the 
Arizona Attorney General (the "Arizona AG"), and the UEP Trust 
through the special fiduciary all filed oppositions to the FLDS 
Association's Petition for Extraordinary Writ. Among other 
things, they have alleged that the FLDS Association lacks 
standing, that it has other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies 
available, and that laches bar the FLDS Association's claims. 
1f22 The FLDS Association then filed a rule 8A petition with 
this court for emergency relief. This petition centered around 
three separate actions taken by the district court and the 
special fiduciary. First, the district court had allowed the 
special fiduciary to begin seeking buyers for certain Trust 
property the FLDS Association claimed was sacred. Second, the 
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special fiduciary had sold some of the Trust's dairy cows subject 
to a right to repurchase that was set to expire. Third, the 
district court had entered an order that asked the Utah AG and 
the special fiduciary to submit suggestions under seal regarding 
how the Trust could be administered in such a way that might 
avoid the kind of extensive litigation that continued to ensue. 
The FLDS Association's petition asked us to stop the sale of the 
Trust property they deemed sacred, extend the time for repurchase 
of the dairy cows, and reverse the district court's order that 
sealed the submissions by the Utah AG and the special fiduciary. 
The petition for emergency relief drew responses from the special 
fiduciary on behalf of the UEP Trust, Harker Dairy (the purchaser 
of the cows), the "Twin Cities" (Hilldale and Colorado City), and 
the Arizona AG. We denied the FLDS Association's Petition for 
Emergency Relief.8 
5f23 We now address the FLDS Association's rule 65B Petition 
for Extraordinary Writ. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code section 78A-3-102(2) (Supp. 2010). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1[24 The FLDS Association bases its petition on rule 65B, 
which states that, so long as "no other plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy is available, . . . relief may be granted . . . 
where an inferior court . . . has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
8
 The FLDS Association's petitions and the responses thereto 
have spawned additional litigation. The Utah AG has moved to 
strike the response of the Twin Cities, which we granted to the 
degree that the Twin Cities brought new claims, and otherwise 
deferred. The Utah AG also moved to strike a supplement that 
added Lyle Jeffs and Willie Jessop as named petitioners in this 
action. We have deferred this motion. The FLDS Association has 
moved to strike exhibits and related arguments in the Utah AG's 
and special fiduciary's responses. We have deferred this motion. 
The Original Interested Individuals have moved to transmit the 
record of proceedings below. The FLDS Association has opposed 
this motion, and we have deferred it. Because of our resolution 
in this case, we find it unnecessary to rule on any of these 
deferred motions. Additionally, on August 19, 2 010, the FLDS 
Association filed a Petition for Emergency Relief asking this 
court to enjoin the Third District Court from administering the 
UEP Trust until we render our decision in this case. The Utah 
AG, the Arizona AG, and the UEP Trust through the Special 
Fiduciary opposed this petition. The issuance of this opinion 
renders ruling on that petition unnecessary. 
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abused its discretion."9 Specifically, the FLDS Association 
alleges that the district court "committed an unprecedented abuse 
of discretion" when it reformed the UEP Trust. But parties who 
file petitions for extraordinary writ under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65B have "'no right to receive a remedy that corrects a 
lower court's mishandling of a particular case.'"10 So even if 
the FLDS Association shows that the district court abused its 
discretion, extraordinary M[r]elief under rule 65B(d)(2) is 
completely at the discretion of [this court]."11 Several factors 
inform our discretion to grant extraordinary relief, including 
the "'egregiousness of the alleged error, the significance of the 
legal issue presented by the petition, the severity of the 
consequences occasioned by the alleged error,' and any additional 
factors that may be regarded as important to the case's 
outcome."12 While "there is no fixed limitation period governing 
the time for filing [extraordinary writs]," they "should be filed 
within a reasonable time after the act complained of has been 
done or refused," and "the equitable doctrine of laches is 
available to dismiss untimely writs."13 
ANALYSIS 
f25 The FLDS Association's claims fall into two broad 
categories: first, that the district court's modification of the 
UEP Trust violated Utah law and the FLDS Association's members' 
constitutional rights; and second, that during the district 
court's ongoing administration of the Trust, the district court 
and the special fiduciary have engaged in conduct that also 
violates the FLDS Association's members' constitutional rights. 
In Part I, we hold that the FLDS Association's claims regarding 
the district court's modification of the Trust are barred by the 
equitable doctrine of laches. In Part II, we hold that all of 
the FLDS Association's remaining claims regarding the Trust's 
administration, except one, are also barred by laches. The claim 
that is not barred by laches is not ripe for our consideration. 
9
 Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a), (d)(2) (emphasis added). 
10
 State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, f 7, 214 P.3d 104 (quoting 
State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, U 23, 127 P.3d 682). 
11
 Id. 1 8 . . 
12
 Id. f 9 (quoting Barrett, 2005 UT 88, f 24). 
13
 Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 684 
(Utah 1995). 
11 No. 20090859 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I. THE FLDS ASSOCIATION'S CLAIMS REGARDING TRUST MODIFICATION 
ARE BARRED BY LACHES BECAUSE OF THE FLDS ASSOCIATION'S DELAY IN 
FILING THE CLAIMS AND THE PREJUDICE THAT HAS RESULTED 
H26 Because the FLDS Association has waited nearly three 
years from the date the district court modified the UEP Trust to 
challenge its modification and, in the interim, transactions have 
occurred and other parties have acted in reliance on the Trust's 
modification, the FLDS Association's claims are barred by the 
equitable doctrine of laches. The FLDS Association asserts that 
the district court modified the Trust in violation of Utah law 
and the federal and state constitutions, and that the continued 
administration of the Trust violates their constitutional rights. 
Despite the potential merit of these claims, the district court's 
order was never appealed, and the FLDS Association has waited 
nearly three years from the date of the Trust's modification to 
bring its case to this court. During this time, countless 
transactions have taken place in reliance on the Trust's 
modification. Accordingly, we dismiss these claims pursuant to 
the doctrine of laches. 
H27 There is no statute of limitations for bringing a rule 
65B claim, but such claims "should be filed within a reasonable 
time after the act complained of has been done or refused."14 
And although laches is most often thought of as an affirmative 
defense to untimely claims brought by a plaintiff, we have held 
that "the equitable doctrine of laches is available to dismiss 
untimely writs."15 We have called laches u'delay that works a 
disadvantage to another.'"16 So, laches has two elements: (1) a 
party's lack of diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that 
lack of diligence.17 
1128 The length of time that constitutes a lack of diligence 
"depend[s] on the circumstances of each case," because "the 
propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon the 
gravity of the prejudice suffered . . . and the length of [the] 
14
 Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 684 




 Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 
1983) (quoting Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping 
Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975)). 
17
 Id. 
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delay."18 In determining whether to apply the doctrine of 
laches, we consider the relative harm caused by the petitioner's 
delay, the relative harm to the petitioner, and whether or not 
the respondent acted in good faith.19 Further, "reasonable delay 
caused by an effort to settle a dispute does not invoke the 
doctrine of laches.'"20 
f29 In our 1975 case, Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. 
Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, we thoroughly explored the 
way Utah courts apply the doctrine of laches. There we held that 
a district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the 
plaintiffs' claims were not barred by laches.21 In that case, 
the defendants built a structure that encroached on a parking 
easement owned by the plaintiffs.22 When the plaintiffs noticed 
the defendants building the structure, they promptly contacted 
the defendants to object.23 The parties' lawyers exchanged 
letters, and significantly, over the next few months, the 
defendants attempted to negotiate a purchase of the plaintiffs' 
interest.24 Eighteen months after first noticing the building of 
the structure, the plaintiffs sued to enforce the restrictive 
covenant that created the easement.25 The defendants urged 
laches as a bar to enforcement.26 We held that there was "not 
the same imminent necessity for early enforcement of demands" as 
might have existed before the conditions became fixed because the 
defendants had uopenly defie[d] [the plaintiffs'] known rights," 
without any indication of "assent or abandonment of intent to 
oppose on the part of [the plaintiffs]," and because the 
18
 Papanikolas Bros., 535 P.2d at 1260. 
19




 Id. at 1261. 
22
 IcL_ at 1258, 1260. 
23
 IcL_ at 1260. 
24
 Id. 
25 j ^ 
26
 Id^ _ 
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plaintiffs' delay caused "no substantial harm" to the 
defendants.27 
1|3 0 The facts of the case now before us could not be more 
starkly different. The district court finalized its modification 
of the UEP Trust in October 2006 after nearly a year of 
discussion and an invitation to interested parties to make 
suggestions for modification.28 The order reforming the Trust 
was never appealed. The FLDS Association filed this petition 
over four years after the Utah AG had intervened, over four years 
after the special fiduciary had been appointed, and nearly three 
years after the district court had modified the Trust. This 
amounts to at least twice the length of time that the plaintiffs 
in Papanikolas Bros. waited. The FLDS Association's brief does 
not explain why the Association waited so long to challenge the 
Trust's reformation. But the FLDS Association's numerous 
complaints about the special fiduciary's administration of the 
Trust make clear it was not because the Association was unaware 
of the modification. Although the opposition briefs cite the 
FLDS Association's delay as a reason for this court to dismiss 
the petition, the FLDS Association does not respond with 
explanations as to why this delay is reasonable. Where in 
Papanikolas Bros, it was clear that the plaintiffs' negotiations 
with the defendants might have given them reason to delay 
litigation, here there were no discussions held with the district 
court until November 2008--nearly two years after the Trust had 
been modified and over three years after the litigation began--
despite assurances by the court that participation was welcome. 
This delayed first contact with the district court spawned 
negotiations between the interested parties, who agreed to stay 
litigation in an effort to avoid the sale of certain Trust 
property. But these negotiations do not make the case for 
applying the doctrine of laches any less compelling. Unlike the 
prompt negotiations in Papanikolas Bros., these discussions came 
nearly two years after the act now complained of by the FLDS 
Association--the district court's reformation of the Trust. 
Negotiations entered into nearly two years after events that 
formed the basis of a complaint do not excuse a nearly three-year 
delay in petitioning this court for extraordinary relief. 
27
 Id. at 1260-61 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28
 The district court's memorandum decision stated, "In 
accord with the order and timetable discussed at the November 7th 
hearing, all parties in interest are invited to provide the Court 
with their specific suggestions for reforming the Trust within 
the framework and principles provided by this Memorandum 
Decision." 
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f31 Additionally, the FLDS Association's silence during the 
Trust reformation process and the Trust's subsequent 
administration gave the district court every reason to believe 
that the reformation had occurred without opposition. Indeed/ 
while the FLDS Association disagrees with the district court's 
application of the law, the court's motive appears to be 
protection of the beneficiaries' charitable interests, not 
defiance of FLDS Association members' rights under the Trust. 
f32 Because of the three-year delay in the face of 
invitations by the district court to participate, and because 
this delay did not occur under circumstances that might excuse 
it, such as prompt negotiations aimed at avoiding litigation, or 
under circumstances that might make us otherwise hesitant to 
apply the doctrine of laches, the FLDS Association has 
demonstrated a lack of diligence in filing this petition. 
f33 This lack of diligence has caused injury to those who 
relied on the Trust's modification during the FLDS Association's 
delay. The Utah AG aptly describes how the FLDS Association's 
delay has worked to the disadvantage of others: 
In the meantime, the Special Fiduciary 
reasonably relied on the presumptively valid 
appointment and reformation orders. He has 
made choices over the years, many expressly 
approved by Judge Lindberg, that cannot be 
undone. He has incurred irrevocable 
obligations and expenses for the Trust during 
the last four years. Other interested 
persons, including Trust Participants who are 
not members of the Petitioner association, 
have also made irreversible decisions and 
changed their positions based on these 
unappealed and heretofore unchallenged final 
orders. 
f34 Further, the Original Interested Individuals, whose 
looming default judgments led to the district court's reformation 
of the Trust, have expressed that their settlements with the 
Trust were predicated upon the Trust's reformation. That is, 
MhJad it not been for the UEP Trust's reformation, the Original 
Interested Individuals would never have settled their lawsuits 
against the Trust." The FLDS Association's delay in filing this 
petition has injured the Original Interested Individuals because 
it has caused the Individuals to change positions on their own 
claims, and any relief we granted the FLDS Association would 
15 No. 20090859 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
operate against the interests of the Original Interested 
Individuals. 
1|35 In sum, many individuals have relied upon the district 
court's final order from over three years ago, and the FLDS 
Association has given no adequate explanation for its delay in 
appealing or otherwise petitioning for relief. The FLDS 
Association has shown a lack of diligence in challenging the 
modification of the Trust, and this lack of diligence has 
operated to the detriment of others. The FLDS Association offers 
no adequate explanation for its delay and no other circumstances 
exist that might make us otherwise hesitant to apply laches. 
Accordingly, we dismiss the FLDS Association's Trust modification 
claims pursuant to the doctrine of laches. 
II. THE FLDS ASSOCIATION'S TRUST ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS ARE ALSO 
BARRED BY LACHES, EXCEPT ONE THAT IS NOT RIPE FOR OUR 
CONSIDERATION 
. 1|36 The FLDS Association/s remaining claims, many of which 
merely recharacterize its first claim, either suffer from the 
same lack of diligence as its Trust modification claims and are 
also barred by laches, except one claim that is barred because 
it is not ripe for our consideration. The FLDS Association 
claims that the continuing administration of the Trust violates 
its members' constitutional rights. The FLDS Association cites 
Colorado Christian University v. Weaver—a case that held 
unconstitutional publicly funded scholarships for students 
attending public, private, and sectarian, but not pervasively 
sectarian universities29--for the propositions that the 
Establishment Clause forbids discrimination within and among 
religions, intrusive inquiry into religious matters, and forcing 
people to choose between their religious beliefs and government 
benefits. The FLDS Association complains of five actions taken 
by the district court--characterized as pertaining to the 
administration of the Trust--that the Association feels are 
constitutionally infirm. 
1J37 But the first four of these actions either occurred 
before or as part of the district court's modification of the 
Trust and, just as the modification claims discussed in Part I, 
could have been and should have been brought three years ago. 
For instance, the FLDS Association first claims that the district 
court did not properly consider the special fiduciary's 
background and qualifications before selecting him. But the 
special fiduciary was selected before the Trust was modified. 
29
 534 F.3d 1245, 1250, 1269 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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The FLDS Association next claims that the court improperly 
allowed FLDS detractors to take the "laboring oar" in drafting 
the reformed Trust. But this claim is really a 
recharacterization of the claim discussed in Part I, because it 
goes to the Trust's modification and not its subsequent 
administration. The FLDS Association's third claim--that the 
Special Fiduciary and the individuals who sued the Trust openly 
shared with the court that their purpose in reforming the Trust 
was to transform FLDS culture and liberate the FLDS people--also 
goes to the modification of the Trust rather than its 
administration. The fourth claim complains that the advisory 
board that the district court selected consisted of enemies of 
the FLDS Church. But the advisory board was created by the 
district court's December 2005 order, issued ten months before 
the Trust was modified. 
1
 f38 To the degree that any of these claim's actually go to 
Trust administration and are not merely recharacterizations of 
the modification claims, any claims arising out of events that 
occurred during or before Trust modification suffer from the same 
defects as the FLDS Association's first claims: a lack of 
diligence and prejudice resulting from that lack of diligence. 
Here again, the FLDS Association could have brought these claims 
at least three years earlier. In the interim, parties have 
changed their positions, Trust participants have made 
irreversible decisions, and the special fiduciary has entered 
into irrevocable transactions and obligations. For the same 
reasons as discussed in Part I, these claims are barred by the 
equitable doctrine of laches. 
f39 Only the FLDS Association's fifth claim arises from 
facts that occurred after the Trust was modified. Here the FLDS 
Association alleges that the district court endorsed a religious 
test that would give former FLDS members outright deeds to Trust 
property but would relegate current and practicing FLDS members 
to receiving spendthrift trusts based on the concern that they 
might deed their property back to FLDS Church leaders. It 
alleges that taking FLDS members' religion into consideration 
when determining eligibility for transfers of property from the 
Trust violates the members' First Amendment rights by forcing 
them to choose between their religion and a government benefit. 
f40 But even on its face, the FLDS Association's last claim 
is not ripe. The ripeness doctrine "serves to prevent courts 
17 NO. 20090859 
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from issuing advisory opinions" on issues that are not ripe for 
adjudication.30 
A dispute is ripe when a conflict over the 
application of a legal provision has 
sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of 
legal rights and obligations between the 
parties thereto. An issue is not ripe for 
appeal if there exists no more than a 
difference of opinion regarding the 
hypothetical application of a provision to a 
situation in which the parties might, at some 
future time, find themselves.31 
An issue is not ripe, for instance, in a situation where even if 
we agree with the petitioner's legal analysis of an issue, such 
an analysis would have no application to the facts the petitioner 
alleges.32 Even if we were to agree with the FLDS Association's 
assertion that district court relegation of FLDS Church members 
to receiving spendthrift trusts on the basis of their religion 
would violate the state and federal constitutions, that analysis 
would not apply to the facts the FLDS Association has alleged. 
f41 The FLDS Association does not allege that either the 
district court or special fiduciary has actually used religion as 
a factor in determining how to parse out property. It does not 
cite any instance where an active FLDS member received a lesser 
delegation of property because of his or her religious beliefs. 
So, the FLDS Association does not assert an ^actual" clash of 
legal rights. And given the district court's and the special 
fiduciary's assertions both in district court hearings and at 
oral argument in this case that a religious test would not be 
imposed--a position the FLDS Association acknowledges the special 
30
 State v. Ortiz, 1999 UT 84, K 2, 987 P.2d 39; see also 
Clegg v. Wasatch Cnty., 2010 UT 5, H 26, 227 P.3d 1243. 
31
 Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, H 29, 215 P.3d 
933 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 
32, H 20, 94 P.3d 217 ("[A]n issue is not ripe for review where 
there is no actual or imminent clash between the parties." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
32
 See Bd. of Trs. v. Keystone Conversions, LLC, 2004 UT 84, 
f 32, 103 P.3d 686 (declining to reach the merits of the 
appellant's argument because the appellant's claim of harm was 
purely hypothetical and not yet realized). 
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fiduciary has taken--such a clash does not seem "imminent," but 
rather merely "hypothetical." At most, the discussions the FLDS 
Association cites evince a concern shared by the district court 
and the special fiduciary that, without careful planning, Trust 
distributions could lead to the creation of a new trust 
containing many of the same attributes that have, on more than 
one occasion, landed the UEP Trust in Utah courts. But this does 
not mean that the district court "actually" has or "imminently" 
will use religion to discriminate against FLDS members, so this 
last claim is not ripe for our review. 
f42 Because most of the FLDS Association's Trust 
administration claims suffer from the same lack of diligence and 
resultant prejudice as its modification claims, those claims are 
also barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. The FLDS 
Association's claim that the district court might use religion as 
a basis for determining'property distributions is not ripe 
because the FLPS Association does not allege that such 
discriminatory distributions have actually occurred or are 
imminent, 
CONCLUSION 
il.43 The FLDS Association was not diligent in challenging 
the district court's modification of the UEP Trust, and that lack 
of diligence has resulted in prejudice to numerous parties. 
Therefore, the FLDS Association's Trust modification claims are 
barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. The FLDS 
Association's remaining Trust administration claims suffer from 
the same lack of diligence and resultant prejudice and are 
similarly barred by laches, except for one claim that is barred 
because it is unripe for adjudication. Accordingly, we decline 
to reach the merits of these claims and dismiss the FLDS 
Association's Petition for Extraordinary Writ. 
1J44 Chief Justice Durham, Justice Parrish, Justice Nehring, 
and Judge Thorne concur in Associate Chief Justice Durrant's 
opinion. 
f45 Court of Appeals Judge William A. Thorne sat. 
19 No. 20090859 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
